2 U.O. BUTTATS 3 r regional Orda 4 5 6 HONORABLE JUDGE Gary Carter 7 8 9 George Paul Trejo, Jr. TREIO LAW OFFICES 10 701 No. 1* Street, Suite 103 Yakima, WA 98901 11 (509) 452-7777 12 Counsel for Mr. Villegas-Delgadillo 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 14 DISTRICT OF IDAHO 15 BOISE 16 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. No. 03CR-00109-001-BLW 17 Plaintiff, DEFENDANT'S SENTENCING MEMO 18 vs. 19 FLORENTINO VILLEGAS-DELGADILLO, 20 Defendant. 21 SUMMARY 22 The defendant submits that the undercover officers engaged in sentencing 23 entrapment because they should have arrested him after the first delivery or few 24 deliveries instead of systematically engaging in dozens of small quantity deliveries. Mr. 25 Villegas-Delgadillo urges this court to reduce the amount of controlled substances 26 attributable to him by disregarding or eliminating the amount involved in all the sales. 27 28

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DE3FENDANT'S SENTENCING MEMO

GEORGE PAUL TREIO, JR. TREIO LAW OFFICE 701 NO. 18 STREET, SUITE 103 YAKIMA WA 98901 (509) 452-7777

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Additionally, or even alternatively, the defendant contends that separate conspiracies exist in this case such that he should not be held accountable for the entire amounts attributed to him for purposes of his base level offense.

Finally, the defendant objects to the imposition of the recommended four-point enhancement for leader/organizer. Essentially, this defendant served as the go between for the actual source/owner of the drugs in the transactions he was involved in. In any event, he was not the leader/organizer of the 13 plus drug distributors during the course of this investigation.

FACTUAL DISPUTES

At the outset, it is important to note that the defendant was in Mexico from December 2001 until April 2002 and then again from September 2002 until May 2003. Yet, during these dates the defendant is alleged to be responsible for deliveries conducted by other individuals who he supposedly supplied. As he was not even in this country, and no wire transfers were ever sent to him, it is somewhat clear the deliveries in these time periods should be excluded from the relevant conduct.

- § 34. The defendant does not dispute the facts contained in this paragraph to the extent that they are attributed to "co-defendants." However, the defendant disputes the following to the extent the Government seeks to attribute the facts to him.
 - a. The defendant disputes that he was anyone's "boss."
 - b. The defendant disputes that any "runner" acted on his behalf. He disputes that he met with any "runners."
 - c. Overall, there were ongoing separate conspiracies. At times, when one group was unable to fill an order a separate and distinct group provided the controlled substances.
- § 35. The defendant acknowledges that he did drive a juvenile and they delivered drugs to the detective.

- § 39. The defendant acknowledges that he obtained controlled substances from Martin Cosme-Jara. To the extent that the Government has independent information that Mr. Gonzales was in fact a drug dealer, Mr. Villegas disputes that he dealt drugs with him.
 - a. To the extent this paragraph identifies runners, it is so vague and ambiguous as to the nexus between the alleged runners and Mr. Villegas that it certainly should not be used as the basis to establish him as a leader.
 - b. The defendant disputes that he was receiving cash on a daily basis as is suggested in this paragraph. The defendant did not personally, nor did he direct individuals to retrieve money for him on a daily basis.
- § 41 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of .6 grams of heroin on November 28, 2001.
- § 42 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of .28 grams of heroin on December 5, 2001. To the extent that this paragraph suggest s that Mr. Villegas was involved in an unlawful business venture with Michelle Goddard, the same is disputed. To the extent that Ms. Goddard is purportedly one of the individuals whom Mr. Villegas was a leader over, the same is disputed.
- § 43 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 1.4 grams of heroin on December 13, 2001. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.
- § 44 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of .3 grams of heroin on December 21, 2001. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 45 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of .6 grams of heroin on December 27, 2001. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 46 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of .6 grams of heroin on January 23, 2002. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 47 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 1.1 grams of heroin on February 4, 2002. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 48 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 1.3 grams of heroin on February 12, 2002. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 49 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 1.3 grams of heroin on February 14, 2002. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 50 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 1.8 grams of heroin on February 26, 2002. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 51 The defendant disputes that Ramon Alonso Burgara is his son. He further disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 1 or more grams of heroin on February 14, 2002. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr.

Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 52 This paragraph clearly identifies Ricardo Alcala as being involved with Willie aka Victor Duarte. It does not establish any nexus between those men and Mr. Villegas. The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 1.4 grams of heroin on March 11, 2002. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 53 To the extent this paragraph seeks to establish that Mr. Villegas was involved with these unidentified male or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 54 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 4.8 grams of heroin on April 15, 2002. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed. This paragraph simply establishes the existence of separate conspiracies. As noted therein, it establishes that Ramon Burgara-Torres was a leader of an organization to which Carlos DeLeon and Saul Arce-Magana were key members.

§ 55 The defendant acknowledges being in the Green Pontiac Grand Am. The reason that Roberto Bermudez occupied the vehicle was because he used it to take a driving test for his license. Mr. Villegas did not participate in, direct, or otherwise aid and abet any alleged deliveries by Victor Manuel Castillo Duarte. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 56 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 2.9 grams of heroin on April 29, 2002. Clearly, this amount should be attributed to Victor Manuel Castillo Duarte and Roberto Bermudez. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 57 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 4.3 grams of heroin on May 9, 2002. Again, he disputes that Ramon Burgara is his son. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed. The mere fact that the vehicle at issue was previously seen at the defendant's residence should be insufficient to attribute this transaction to him. Moreover, this paragraph provides further credence to the fact that Victor had his own ongoing business when the unidentified female placed an order directly from him.

§ 58 The defendant occasionally sent t money to relatives in Mexico. However, there are no facts that establish that, assuming arguendo, that the defendant wired money to Mexico on this date, that it was an illegal transaction.

§ 59 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 4.3 grams of heroin on May 23, 2002. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 60 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 2.3 grams of heroin and 2 ounces of methamphetamine on June 17, 2002. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 61 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 6.1 grams of heroin and 2 ounces of methamphetamine on July 2, 2002. Once again, this transaction establishes that Ramon and Victor were involved in a conspiracy. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 62 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 11.6 grams of heroin and 2 ounces of methamphetamine on July 18, 2002. Once again, this transaction establishes that Ramon and Victor were involved in a conspiracy. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the DE3FENDANT'S SENTENCING MEMO - 6-

leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed. Similarly, Ramon and Victor proceeded to make additional sales of controlled substances following this transaction without any contact whatsoever with Mr. Villegas given further credence to the argument that separate conspiracies existed.

The defendant disputes that Victor Duarte, Ramon Burgara and **§** 63. "numerous other drug runners" worked for Mr. Villegas. The defendant disputes that he was involved in any delivery of drugs on July 24, 25, or 26, 2002. Once again, this transaction establishes that Ramon and Victor were involved in a conspiracy. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

- Bobbie Brown is not the sister-in-law of Florentino Villegas she is a. the girl friend of his cousin.
- The defendant further disputes that he controlled both residences; b.
- It is not unusual for a vehicle to park overnight at a residence; c.
- d. Moreover, other than mere conclusory allegations, there are no facts that establish the connection between Mr. Villegas and the alleged drug dealing outlined in this paragraph.
- § 64 The defendant disputes that he was involved in any drug dealing with Jesus Rodelo. Mr. Villegas rented a trailer/mobile home from Mr. Rodelo at 1193 SE 11th Street. Mr. Villegas disputes that Mr. Rodelo is a drug dealer but instead was Mr. Villegas' landlord.
- To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute overt acts to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.
- The defendant disputes that he was involved in arranging for the delivery § 66 on August 15, 2002. The arrangements were made exclusively between Victor Duarte and the undercover officer. Once again, this transaction establishes Victor was involved in a conspiracy. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr.

Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of this individual, the same is disputed.

§ 67 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 3.4 grams of heroin on August 15, 2002. Once again, this transaction establishes that Ramon and Victor were involved in a conspiracy as they arrived together to deliver to the undercover officer. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 68 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of heroin set up for the next day; August 27, 2002. Once again, this transaction establishes that Ramon and Victor were involved in a conspiracy. Although Ramon informed the undercover officer that Victor was in Mexico, Ramon arranged for the delivery of the drugs on behalf of Victor. Mr. Florentino Villegas name was never even mentioned To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 69 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 3.2 grams of heroin on August 27, 2002. Ramon Burgara and David Aguirre delivered the drugs to the undercover officer's apartment. Once again, this transaction establishes that Ramon and Victor were involved in a conspiracy with others. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 70 The defendant disputes that he was involved in arranging the delivery of 4 ounces of methamphetamine on September 9, 2002. The transaction was negotiated between Ramon Burgara and the detective. The defendant submits that at times he was a middleman/source of drugs but not a leader or organizer of Mr. Burgara. He disputes that he was a "boss." Once again, this transaction establishes that Ramon and Victor were involved in a conspiracy. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 73 The defendant disputes that he acknowledged Ramon Burgara as his son. He referred to Ramon as "el chavalo" or the boy but not as his own biological son. Mr. Villegas disputes that he said he was in charge of the drug sales. Mr. Villegas submits that Ramon, Victor Duarte, Ricardo Alcala and Nicolas Verdin each had their own ongoing separate conspiracies. Mr. Villegas disputes that he was the leader/organizer of these individuals.

§ 75 To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of the listed individuals, the same is disputed. This paragraph simply establishes that Ramon Burgara had an associate: Michael Aguirre.

§ 76 To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of the listed individuals, the same is disputed. Mr. Villegas had no knowledge of the kilo of cocaine or the heroin seized.

§ 77 Mr. Villegas disputes that Roberto Bermudez was working for him. He further disputes that money was dropped off to him on a daily basis. Moreover, despite the extensive surveillance, the evidence does not support this allegation. Similarly, it would have been impossible to accomplish given the fact that Mr. Villegas spent several months in Mexico during the course of the charged conspiracy.

§ 79 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 4.1 grams of heroin on October 28, 2002. Once again, this transaction establishes that Victor was involved in a conspiracy with unknown Mexican males as they arrived together to deliver to the undercover officer. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 80 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 4.5 grams of heroin on October 30, 2002. There is no nexus between Mr. Villegas and Ricardo Alcala as to this delivery. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 81 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 249.7 grams of methamphetamine on November 15, 2002. Once again, this transaction establishes that Ramon and Victor were involved in a conspiracy. In this transaction, Carlos Covarrubias delivered drugs to the undercover detective. Immediately thereafter, the funds were delivered to Victor Duarte and not Mr. Villegas. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 82 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 33.3 grams of heroin on December 9, 2002. Once again, this transaction establishes that lack of any nexus to Mr. Villegas with regard to the computer or the drugs that were delivered. It appears that Ricardo Alcala, Ramon and Victor were involved in the same conspiracy. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 84 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 30.9 grams of heroin on December 10, 2002. Once again, this transaction establishes that Victor was involved in a conspiracy, and probably the "boss." To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 85 As Mr. Villegas had nothing to do with the laptop computer, the cocaine Ricardo Alcala agreed to provide the undercover officer should not be attributed to him for purposes of relevant conduct.

§ 86 See, objection to § 85.

§ 87 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 52 grams of methamphetamine on January 10, 2003. Once again, this transaction establishes that Victor was acting independently from Mr. Villegas. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 88 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 64.9 grams of methamphetamine on January 21, 2003. Once again, this transaction establishes that Mr. Villegas was not part of all the deliveries negotiated with known traffickers. Nicolas Verdin apparently obtained these drugs from Michelle Goddard and not Mr. Villegas. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 89 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 57.7 grams of methamphetamine on February 18, 2003. Once again, this transaction establishes that Victor Duarte and other unknown members of his organization were involved in a separate conspiracy. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 90 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 68.6 grams of methamphetamine on February 27, 2003. Once again, this transaction establishes a separate conspiracy as the drugs were provided by Nicolas Verdin at the Verdin residence. Mr. Villegas had nothing to do with the one-pound of methamphetamine or one ounce of heroin inside Mr. Verdin's bedroom. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 91 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 2.5 grams of heroin and two ounces of methamphetamine on April 1, 2003. Once again, this transaction establishes the drug dealing activity of Nicolas Verdin separate and independent from Mr. Villegas. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 92 The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 27.2 grams of heroin on April 17, 2003. Once again, this transaction establishes that Victor Duarte and other unknown members of his organization were involved in a separate DESFENDANT'S SENTENCING MEMO - 11-

conspiracy. Mr. Villegas was not involved in this transaction in any manner whatsoever. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of .63 grams of heroin on April 22, 2003 from Michelle Goddard at her residence. The delivery took place after Ms. Goddard received the heroin from Victor Duarte and Ramon Burgara. Once again, this transaction establishes that Victor Duarte and other unknown members of his organization were involved in a separate conspiracy. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 1.5 grams $\S 94$ of heroin on May 14, 2003 from Michelle Goddard at her residence. The delivery took place after Ms. Goddard received the heroin from Victor Duarte and Ramon Burgara. Once again, this transaction establishes that Victor Duarte and other unknown members of his organization were involved in a separate conspiracy. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 1.48 grams of heroin on May 20, 2003 from Michelle Goddard at her residence. The delivery took place after Ms. Goddard received the heroin from Victor Duarte and Ramon Burgara. Once again, this transaction establishes that Victor Duarte and other unknown members of his organization were involved in a separate conspiracy. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

The defendant disputes that he was involved in the delivery of 2 ounces **§ 96** of methamphetamine on June 2, 2003 from Nicolas Verdin. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed. - 12§ 98 The defendant disputes the amounts listed in this paragraph. It was actually \$600.00 per ounce for a total of \$5,400.00.

§ 100 The defendant was only going to provide the drugs because Victor Duarte was not in the area. The defendant and Victor had separate ongoing businesses. To the extent this paragraph seeks to attribute quantities to Mr. Villegas or that he was the leader/supervisor of these two individuals, the same is disputed.

§ 110 The defendant disputes that Genoveva Gonzalez identified Ramon Burgara as Mr. Villegas' son.

GROUP ONE

§ 118 The defendant disputes the entirety of this paragraph except to the extent that he has admitted to certain deliveries herein. He was not the source/leader of 13 distributors in the area. The drugs located at the Bermudez residence or the Ontario residences were not his.

§ 119 The defendant disputes that he was the source for the drugs distributed between November 228, 2001 and February 26, 2002 by Mr. Alcala and Mr. Lopez. As previously noted, Mr. Alcala is not his brother-in-law. They always maintained separate and distinct business ventures even prior to March 2002.

- § 120 Mr. Villegas disputes the quantities attributed to him in this paragraph.
- § 121 See, Objection to paragraph 120.
- § 122 See, Objection to paragraph 120.
- § 125 See, Objection to paragraph 118. The defendant also contends that no leader/organizer points should be attributed to him.
- § 156 The defendant first arrived in the United States in 1994 for two months. He was working in construction but his brother unexpectedly died in Mexico. That was the result of the sudden return.

ARGUMENT

THIS COURT SHOULD SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT WITHOUT REGARD TO THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF DRUGS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM BECAUSE SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT OCCURRED

The court at sentencing determines the quantity of drugs for which a defendant is responsible. See <u>United States v. Castaneda</u>, <u>94 F.3d 592</u>, 594 (9th Cir. 1996). Sentencing entrapment or sentence factor manipulation occurs when a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped in committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment." <u>United States v. Staufer</u>, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant bears the burden of proving sentencing entrapment only by a preponderance of the evidence. See <u>United States v. Parrilla</u>, <u>114 F.3d 124</u>, 127 (9th Cir. 1997). The district court is obligated to make express factual findings as to whether the defendant met this burden. See id.

There are two possible remedies for sentencing entrapment. "First, a sentencing court may decline to apply the statutory penalty provision for the greater offense that the defendant was induced to commit, and instead apply the penalty provision for the lesser offense that the defendant was predisposed to commit." Id. Alternatively, the sentencing court may grant a downward departure from the sentencing range for the greater offense that the defendant was induced to commit. See id.

However, because a district court may not impose a sentence below a statutory minimum term, the only available remedy for sentencing entrapment where the defendant is faced with a mandatory minimum term is to apply the penalty provision for the lesser offense. Cf. <u>Castaneda</u>, 94 F.3d at 595; <u>Naranjo</u>, 52 F.3d at 251 n. 14. Therefore, if the government induced Villegas-Delgadillo to sell more methamphetamine than he was predisposed to sell, the district court should subtract

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the amount of drugs tainted by the entrapment, and thereby reduce / eliminate the mandatory minimum sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii). See, <u>United States v. Riewe</u>, 165 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 1999).

Since the reduction in the quantity of drugs would result in the application of a different statutory penalty provision altogether, this remedy does not involve a departure from the applicable statutory minimum. See <u>Castaneda</u>, 94 F.3d at 595. Overall, the defendant respectfully submits that this court should sentence him based upon the deliveries he actually plead guilty to and not the small quantities involved in the dozen of deliveries made by members of separate conspiracies.

MR. VILLEGAS SHOULD NOT BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR ACTS COMMITTED BY CO-CONSPIRATORS WHO WERE PART OF A SEPARATE CONSPIRACY FOR PURPOSES OF SETTING THE BASE LEVEL OFFENSE.

The Presentence report found that Mr. Villegas' base offense level is 32 based upon the inclusion of heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine delivered by over a dozen individuals in this case. However, Mr. Villegas submits that he should not be held accountable for negotiations and deliveries made in furtherance of separate conspiracies. That is, Mr. Villegas was in Mexico for months and individuals delivered drugs throughout this time without any direction from him whatsoever. He did not have any intention to become involved in any transactions while out of the country.

Sentencing Guideline 1B 1.3 (a) (2) allows the Court to consider conduct that was "part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction" for the purposes of computing the base offense level. In <u>United States v. Turner</u>, 898 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1990) the Court held that it is proper to aggregate all drugs to determine a defendant's base offense level, rather than considering only the amount involved in the count on which the defendant was convicted. See also Sentencing Guideline Section 2D 1.1 Note 6. However, the Court's consideration of relevant conduct is limited to "acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by

the defendant, or for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable." See Sentencing Guideline Section 1B 1.3 Application Note 2.

The term "for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable" is defined in Guideline 1B 1.3 Application Note 1. That term includes "conduct of others in the furtherance of the execution of a jointly undertaken criminal activity that was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant." Application note 1 further states that "where it is established that the conduct was neither within the scope of the defendant's agreement, nor was reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake, such conduct is not included in establishing the defendant's offense level under this guideline." See also <u>United States v. Williams</u>, 897 F.2d 1034 (10th Cir. 1990), <u>United States v. Foote</u>, 898 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1990) (a defendant is responsible for quantities of drugs that he or she knew or should have known about.) In the case at bar, there is no evidence that Mr. Villegas knew or should have know of the deliveries committed by the other individuals listed in the facts.

Mr. Villegas submits that in order to aggregate all the deliveries the Government seeks to attribute to him, for purposes of establishing his offense level, the trial court must find that his "conduct was within the scope of the . . . agreement" or "that the conduct was reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake." The Court should not make such a finding under the facts and circumstances of this of this case.

This case is similar to <u>United States v. Turner</u>, <u>supra</u>. Turner involved the application of Guideline 2D1.4 and relevant conduct in a conspiracy conviction. The defendant argued that the trial court erred in attributing several drug sales to him. The issue was whether those sales were in furtherance of the conspiracy. The defendant argued that they were not. The trial court did not make a finding as to whether or not the sales in question were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. On appeal the Government argued that those sales could be considered for sentencing purpose as

"relevant conduct". <u>United States v. Turner</u> at 713. In response the appellate court stated:

"The relevant conduct section must be read in conjunction with section 2(d) 1.4. which, by its explicit terms, limits the sentencing court's consideration of a defendant's or co-conspirator's conduct to that conduct which was in 'furtherance of the conspiracy [and] was known to the defendant or was reasonably foreseeable.' Guidelines Manual, Section 2(d) 1.4. Thus, the District Court erred by calculating Beler's base offense level on the basis of his cocaine sales without finding that the sales were in furtherance of the conspiracy for which Beler was convicted. See Warters, 885 F.2d at 1272-1273. The District Court's failure to make such a finding in light of Beler's objection violated Fed.R. Crim. Proc. 32 (c) (3) D (ii) and is further reason to remand." United States v. Turner, 898 at 713 (emphasis added).

The task of sorting out the conflicting views concerning the number of conspiracies is a "frustrating and challenging one." <u>United States v. Perez</u>, 489 F.2d 51, 57 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945. However, the issue is deceptively simple. "The basic test is whether there was one overall agreement to perform various functions to achieve the objectives of the conspiracy." <u>United States v. Arbelaez</u>, 719 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 3543 (1984). A review of the multiple conspiracy cases in the Ninth Circuit indicates that the court has looked at numerous factors in determining whether one or multiple conspiracies are proven. In the case at bar, the defendant submits that there were actually two conspiracies; one involving marijuana and one involving cocaine.

In <u>United States v. Smith</u>, 609 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979), this court looked to a wide variety of factors — the nature of the enterprise, the scope of its operation, the frequency and regularity of transactions, <u>inter alia</u> — as supporting the inference that the defendant knew or should have known that he was participating in a single overall scheme. The <u>Smith</u> case analyzed the evidence before it to determine:

. . . whether the government has produced enough evidence for a fact finder to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt (1) that the charged conspiracy existed, (2) that the defendant had at least a slight connection to it, and (3) that the defendant knew he was connected to the charged conspiracy. Id. at 1297.

This court then went on to focus on the defendant's "knowing connection" and identified that factors above as supporting an inference of a defendant's knowledge of his participation in the overall unlawful agreement. Here, Mr. Villegas was simply involved in delivering marijuana and should not be held accountable for the cocaine.

THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE ASSESSED A FOUR POINT ENHANCEMENT FOR LEADER/ORGANIZER

This court can only be reversed if its decision is clearly erroneous. <u>United States v. Phillips</u>, 959 F.2d 1187, 1191 (3rd Cir. 1992). A findings is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing all of the evidence, it is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. at 1191 (citing <u>Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.</u>, 747 F.2d 844, 850 (3d Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137, 105 S.Ct. 2678, 86 L.Ed.2d 696 (1985). In any event, an upward adjustment must be based on more than a hunch, no matter how sound his instincts or how sagacious his judgment. <u>United States v. Ortiz</u>, 966 F.2d 707, 717 (1st Cir. 1992). There are insufficient facts to warrant a 2 level enhancement in this case.

Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.1 provides a range of increases in an offense level for defendants found to have played an aggravated role in the underlying criminal activity. Section 3B1.1's core focus is relative responsibility: "[T]hose who play an aggravating role in the offense are to receive sentences that reflect their greater contributions to the illegal scheme." <u>United States v. Brown</u>, 944 F.2d 1377, 1381 (7th Cir. 1991).

The factors to be considered when determining whether a defendant was an organizer or leader include: the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of the offense, the defendant's participation in the offense, the recruitment of

accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. n.4.

To be found responsible for organizing others, and thereby subject to a §3B1.1 enhancement, a defendant must have at least played a significant role in supervising other participants. <u>United States v. Greenfield</u>, 44 F.3d 1141, 1147 (2nd Cir. 1995). No such evidence exists in this case.

To receive a § 3B1.1 increase, a defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of other participants. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, commentary n. 2. Thus, at a minimum, a defendant must have had some real and direct influence, aimed at furthering the criminal activity, upon other identified participants. Section 3B1.1 requires the exercise of some authority in the organization, the exercise of some degree of control, influence, or leadership. <u>United States v. Brown</u>, 944 F.2d at 1385. He did not have such control over others in the underlying venture.

Negotiating terms of their sale do not by themselves justify a Section 3B1.1 adjustment. This does not indicate that the person who does them has a greater degree of responsibility for putting together a particular deal than anyone else involved, including a customer. See, <u>United States v. Brown</u>, 944 F.2d at 1381-82, 1385-86.

Thus, section 3B1.1 applies to situations where an individual is a leader or organizer of individuals who participate together in committing one or more criminal acts. "[T]he adjustments authorized for role in the offense are directed to the relative culpability of participants in *group* conduct." <u>United States v. Bierley</u>, 922 F.2d 1061, 1065 (3rd Cir. 1990).

In <u>United States v. Catano</u>, 65 F.3d 219 (1st Cir. 1995) the 1st Circuit held that the adoption of PSR was not adequate for leadership enhancement. The district court imposed a four-level leadership enhancement, finding that defendant was "the

principal figure, the organizer" of a drug conspiracy. The First Circuit ruled that the adoption of the PSR did not satisfy § 3553(c)'s requirement of a statement of reasons.

Overall, absent pure speculation, there are insufficient facts contained in the PSR to attribute the deliveries outlined by numerous other individuals to Mr. Villegas.

CONCLUSION

The defendant respectfully requests that this court 1) not impose any leader or organizer points; 2) depart downward or sentence him without regard to the transactions he was not involved in; and 3) not impose any leader/organizer points and sentence him to the low end of the applicable sentencing range.

Dated this <u>/</u>5 day of December 2003.

TREJO LAW OFFICES

George Paul Trejo, Jr.

Attorney for Mr. Villegas-Delgadillo

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7		HONORABLE JUDGE Gary Carter		
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9				
10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
11	DISTRICT OF IDAHO			
12	BOISE			
13	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	,)	00CD 00400 004 DIAM
14		Plaintiff,)	03CR-00109-001-BLW
15	vs.) CERTIFIC)	ATE OF SERVICE
16	FLORENTINO VILLEGAS-DELGADILLO,)			
17		Defendant.)	
18	The undersigned hereby certifies that the Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum			
19				
20				T71 41 T711
21	Rafael M. Gonzalez Assistant U.S. Attorney	Sylvia Carv U.S. Probati	on	Florentino Villegas Ada County Jail
22	Box 32 Boise, Idaho 83707	550 W. Fort Boise, Idaho		7210 Barrister Drive Boise, Idaho 83724
23	Dated this $15\frac{45}{\text{day}}$ of December 2003.			
24				
25	TREJO LAW OFFICES			
26	George Paul Treig, Jr.			
27	Attorney for Mr. Villegas-Delgadillo			
28				
	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		- 1-	GEORGE PAUL TREIO, IR TREIO LAW OFFICE

GEORGE PAUL TREIO, JR. TREIO LAW OFFICE 701 NO. 1³ STREET, SUITE 103 YAKIMA WA 98901 (509) 452-7777